Rome v. State Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 45140 by unknown
UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
4-16-2018 
Rome v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 45140 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs 
Recommended Citation 
"Rome v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 45140" (2018). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 
7160. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7160 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by 
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact 
annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
SONNY ROME, )
) NO. 45140
Petitioner-Appellant, )
v. ) KOOTENAI COUNTY NO.
) CV 2016-2158
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) APPELLANT’S
Respondent. ) REPLY BRIEF
)
________________________
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
________________________
HONORABLE LANSING L. HAYNES
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
State Appellate Public Defender Deputy Attorney General
I.S.B. #6555 Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
BRIAN R. DICKSON Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender (208) 334-4534
I.S.B. #8701
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
ATTORNEYS FOR ATTORNEY FOR
PETITIONER-APPELLANT RESPONDENT
iTABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ............................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ......................................................................................... 2
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .............................................................................. 3
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 4
I. The District Court Erred By Not Taking Judicial Notice Of The Documents
 In The Underlying Criminal Case Record As Requested By Mr. Rome
 Based On Its Clearly Erroneous Determination That He Had Not
 Requested It Take Judicial Notice ........................................................................ 4
II. The District Court’s Decision To Deny Mr. Rome’s Lesser-Included
 Instruction Claim Fails To Apply The Proper Standards For
 Evaluating A Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
 At An Evidentiary Hearing .................................................................................. 6
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 12
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ..................................................................................... 13
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Ada County Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138 (2017) ......................................8
Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741 (2012) .................................................................5
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789 (2004) .................................................................................7
Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973) ............................................................................ 11
Marr v. State, 163 Idaho 33 (2017) ...................................................................................... 10, 11
Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588 (Ct. App. 1993) ...................................................................... 10, 12
Newman v. State, 149 Idaho 225 (Ct. App. 2010) .................................................................... 5, 6
Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303 (2000) ......................................................................................8
Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759 (1986) .........................................................................................5
State v. Hansen, 130 Idaho 845 (Ct. App. 1997) ..........................................................................5
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598 (1989) ........................................................................................5
State v. Macias, 142 Idaho 509 (Ct. App. 2005) ........................................................................ 10
State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344 (1990) .......................................................................................7
State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437 (2008) .......................................................................................9
Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396 (Ct. App. 2013) ........................................................................ 11
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ...........................................................................6
Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765 (Ct. App. 2008)..........................................................................8
Young v. State, 115 Idaho 52 (Ct. App. 1988) ............................................................................ 11
Statutes
I.C. § 19-2132 ........................................................................................................................... 10
I.C. § 19-4907 ..................................................................................................................... 10, 11
iii
Rules
I.R.E. 201 ....................................................................................................................................6
1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Sonny Rome contends the district court made two errors in addressing his petition for
post-conviction relief.  First, it failed to recognize that he had requested it take judicial notice of
documents from the record of the underlying criminal case, and its resulting decision to not take
judicial notice of those documents adversely impacted its subsequent rulings on the claims in
Mr. Rome’s petition.  Second, because the evidence he had presented was sufficient to establish,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that trial counsel had been ineffective for not requesting an
appropriate lesser-included-offense instruction, the district court erroneously denied him relief
on that claim.
In response to the judicial notice issue, the State has built a fine-looking strawman
argument, attempting to recast Mr. Rome’s argument as a challenge only to the district court’s
decision to deny relief on Mr. Rome’s claim regarding counsel’s failure to argue cumulative
error in his direct appeal.  Furthermore, in its attempt to slay that strawman, the State has
improperly invited this Court to weigh facts not in the record for the first time on appeal.
Neither of the State’s arguments is appropriate.
The State’s response to the lesser-included instruction issue is similarly meritless.   While
the State calls for application of the “proper” standard of review, its argument ignores fully half
of the applicable standards.  Actually applying the proper standards reveals the State’s arguments
to be meritless, and so, this Court should reverse the district court’s decision to deny Mr. Rome’s
post-conviction petition and remand this case for further proceedings.
2Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Rome’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
3ISSUES
I. Whether the district court erred by not taking judicial notice of the documents in the
underlying criminal case record as requested by Mr. Rome based on its clearly erroneous
determination that he had not requested it take judicial notice.
II. Whether the district court’s decision to deny Mr. Rome’s lesser-included instruction
claim fails to apply the proper standards for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel at an evidentiary hearing.
4ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Not Taking Judicial Notice Of The Documents In The Underlying
Criminal Case Record As Requested By Mr. Rome Based On Its Clearly Erroneous
Determination That He Had Not Requested It Take Judicial Notice
The State has built a strawman argument in response to Mr. Rome’s contention regarding
the district court’s failure to recognize that Mr. Rome had repeatedly requested it to take judicial
notice of documents from the underlying criminal case.  While Mr. Rome argued that the district
court resulting failure to take judicial notice affected its subsequent rulings on all the issues he
had  raised  in  his  petition,  the  State  has  attempted  to  recast  this  issue  as  an  argument  that  the
district court erroneously denied his singular claim regarding counsel’s failure to argue
cumulative error on the direct appeal.  (Compare App. Br., pp.6-9; with Resp. Br., pp.5-7.)
The  State’s  strawman  argument  is  revealed  for  what  it  is  by  the  fact  that  the  term
“cumulative error” does not appear in the Appellant’s Brief at all.  (See generally App. Br.)
Thus, it is clear that Mr. Rome’s argument has always been broader than the district court’s
decision on any one of his claims for relief.  In fact, he specifically explained how the district
court’s erroneous decision to not take judicial notice adversely impacted its decision on his claim
regarding trial counsel’s failure to present certain mitigating evidence at sentencing and his claim
regarding trial counsel’s failure to request the lesser-included instruction.  (App. Br., pp.6-8.)
Therefore, this Court should reject the State’s strawman argument, since it does not address the
issue Mr. Rome actually raised in this appeal.
Even considering the merits of the State’s strawman argument, though, it is baseless
because the State’s argument is inconsistent with the applicable standard of review.  The
decision of whether or not to take judicial notice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
5Newman v. State, 149 Idaho 225, 227 (Ct. App. 2010); cf. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600
(1989) (explaining that a district court abuses its discretion by not appreciating the issue is one of
discretion, by making its decision outside the bounds of that discretion or inconsistent with the
applicable legal standards, or by reaching its decision without exercising reason).  In conducting
that review, the appellate courts do “not simply focus upon the results of a discretionary decision
below, but rather upon the process by which the trial court reached its discretionary decision.”
Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 772 (1986).  That is because the ultimate decision, however
proper it might appear, is tainted by the abuse of the district court’s discretion in reaching that
decision. See id.
Nevertheless, the State’s argument focuses on the results of the district court’s analysis,
not the process by which it reached that decision.  (See Resp. Br., pp.6-7, 7 n.1 (arguing “[t]here
is no evidence in this record that counsel’s performance was deficient for failure to claim
cumulative error” and, even considering the information from the underlying criminal case,
“[t]he claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to claim cumulative error is
frivolous”).)  Therefore, this Court should reject that argument, and instead, should remand this
case so the district court can make the discretionary decision under the proper standards in the
first instance. See Quick, 111 Idaho at 772; State v. Hansen, 130 Idaho 845, 848 (Ct. App.
1997); see also Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 749 n.1 (2012) (reiterating that,
while  appellate  courts  may review the  facts  on  appeal,  they  do  not  weigh  the  facts;  that  is  the
province of the district court).
The district court’s abuse of discretion in reaching its decision in this case is clear
because, as the State acknowledges, Mr. Rome repeatedly requested the district court take
judicial notice of certain documents from the underlying criminal case.  (See Resp. Br., p.7.)  The
6applicable legal standard, articulated in I.R.E. 201(d), requires the district court to take judicial
notice of documents from the court’s file when a party requests it do so.1  The district court did
not follow that legal standard because it made the clearly-erroneous determination that it had not
been requested to take judicial notice in the first place.  Therefore, the district court’s decision to
not take judicial notice was an abuse of its discretion because it was not consistent with the
applicable standards, nor was it reached through an exercise of reason.  As a result, this Court
should  vacate  the  decisions  tainted  by  that  error  (the  district  court’s  rulings  on  the  claims
presented  in  Mr.  Rome’s  petition)  and  remand  this  case  so  that  the  district  court  can  properly
weigh those facts from the underlying criminal case in regard to Mr. Rome’s claims for post-
conviction relief in the first instance.
II.
The District Court’s Decision To Deny Mr. Rome’s Lesser-Included Instruction Claim Fails To
Apply The Proper Standards For Evaluating A Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel At
An Evidentiary Hearing
Mr. Rome contends that the evidence he presented in regard to trial counsel’s failure to
request an instruction on the lesser-included offense of accessory-after-the-fact was sufficient to
meet his burden to show ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland.2  The State asserts,
for the first time on appeal, that issue was not properly raised below because it was not in
1 There are other situations in which the decision to take judicial notice is more discretionary.
See I.R.E. 201(c).  In either case, its weighing of the evidence is discretionary, and that is
ultimately why the failure to take judicial notice, the failure to consider facts which should have
been included in its weighing of the evidence, is an abuse of the district court’s discretion. See
Newman, 149 Idaho at 227.
2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
7Mr.  Rome’s  petition  for  relief.   (Resp.  Br.,  p.8.)   The  State’s  argument  is  unfounded  because
Mr. Rome did raise that issue in his verified amended petition.3
Mr. Rome’s sixth claim of ineffective assistance of counsel claimed relief because trial
counsel failed to request the correct jury instruction for aiding and abetting and did not arguing
that alternative theory to the jury.  (R., p.31.)  Specifically, he alleged that “[m]y attorney failed
to obtain a proper jury instruction for ‘aiding and abetting’” and that, had trial counsel made that
argument, “[t]he jury probably would not have convicted me of aiding and abetting a burglary.”
(R., pp.31-32; see R., p.37 (Mr. Rome verifying the allegations in the amended petition).)
He expounded on that claim in his response to the State’s motion for summary dismissal,
arguing:  “the defense attorney did not argue that, with a receipt from the woman who entered
the store, and the circumstances preceding that, that [Mr.] Rome was an accessory after the fact,
not a pre-crime aider and abettor.”  (R., p.62; see also R., p.6 (Mr. Rome alleging in the initial
pro se petition that trial counsel failed to present evidence that the woman had shown him a
receipt allegedly for the stolen item).)  He also argued that “Idaho requires more than mere
knowledge, assent or acquiescence to be guilty of aiding and abetting.”  (R., p.63 (quoting
State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344 (1990).)  Finally, he explained that counsel’s failure to make that
argument was prejudicial because “a conviction for aiding and abetting would not have occurred
3 That  the  issue  was  specifically  articulated  in  the  amended  petition  with  the  assistance  of
counsel, rather than the initial pro se petition, is of no issue.  The point of appointing post-
conviction counsel is to assist the pro se petitioner in properly framing the issues, so as to present
the meritorious claims for the district court’s consideration. See, e.g., Charboneau v. State, 140
Idaho 789, 793-94 (2004) (reiterating that a pro se petitioner may not know what elements he
must prove to make out a valid claim for relief, and because of that, appointed post-conviction
counsel is allowed to file an amended petition or additional affidavit which present claims and
facts in a manner sufficient to prevent summary dismissal of otherwise-valid claims for relief).
Therefore, the effect of the amended petition and the initial petition in terms of framing the
issues being raised for the district court’s consideration is the same.
8if [Mr.] Rome’s attorney would have properly argued that there was insufficient evidence of
aiding and abetting the burglary.”  (R., p.63.)
As such, Mr. Rome raised the issue – that trial counsel should have argued an accessory-
after-the-fact theory to the jury and that he should have requested a proper instruction as part of
that argument – in his petition and consistently argued that position below. Compare Ada
County Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, 142 n.2 (2017) (explaining that an
issue had been sufficiently raised below because, though the specific arguments in regard to that
issue had evolved, the position taken on the actual issue remained the same throughout the
proceedings).
On the merits of this issue, the State reminds the Court that the standard for reviewing a
motion to dismiss is  one of free review.  (Resp. Br.,  p.9.)   However,  the State’s recitation and
application of the standard ignores fully half of the actual standard (see generally Resp. Br.):
In reviewing a decision to grant or deny . . . a directed verdict, the appellate court
applies the same standard that is applied by the trial court when originally hearing
the motion.  This Court must review the record and draw all inferences in favor of
the non-moving party.  Any conflicting evidence must be construed in favor of the
non-moving party, without deference to the decision of the trial court.
Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 312 (2000) (emphasis added).4  In this case, Mr. Rome is the
non-moving party because the State moved for the directed verdict.  (See Tr., p.47, Ls.16-17.)
4 The standard articulated in Polk is applicable in this case because of the particular procedural
stance in which this case has arrived before this Court.  Specifically, the prosecutor represented
that she had evidence to present at the hearing, but did not do so because she chose to move for
the directed verdict first.  (See Tr., p.47, Ls.8-17.)  Mr. Rome recognizes that the usual standard
when a  petition  for  post-conviction  relief  proceeds  to  an  evidentiary  hearing  is:   “an  appellate
court will not disturb the lower court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.  The
credibility of the witnesses,  the weight to be given to their  testimony, and the inferences to be
drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district court.  We
exercise free review of the district court’s application of the relevant law to the facts.”
Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765, 768 (Ct. App. 2008).  If that is the standard properly applied in
this case, the State’s call for free review of the facts without deference (Resp. Br., p.9) would be
9Therefore, properly applying the standard, every factual inference should be construed in
Mr. Rome’s favor.  When the full standard is properly applied, the State’s contention about the
sufficiency of Mr. Rome’s evidence is revealed to be meritless.5
For example, the State contends there was insufficient evidence of deficient performance
because trial counsel only testified about what arguments were available in hindsight.  (Resp.
Br., p.8.)  However, applying the proper standard and construing every factual inference in
Mr. Rome’s favor, trial counsel’s uncontradicted testimony indicates (if not directly asserts) that,
because there was a reasonable basis for the accessory argument and because trial counsel did
not see it at the time, trial counsel was admitting his performance was objectively unreasonable –
that an attorney acting reasonably in that situation would have recognized and raised the
accessory argument in the district court.  (See Tr., p.21, L.20 - p.22, L.3.)
Trial counsel’s testimony also expressly mentioned the possibility of requesting an
instruction on the lesser-included offense:
Q. You did not request an accessory after the fact instruction however, correct?
A. That is correct.
(Tr., p.22, Ls.1-3.)  In combination with trial counsel’s testimony that he could have argued the
accessory theory (Tr., p.21, Ls.21-25), trial counsel’s testimony about not requesting an
accessory instruction infers that, in making the accessory argument, trial counsel would have
requested the applicable lesser-included instruction.  (See also R., pp.31, 37 (Mr. Rome alleging,
improper.  Furthermore, for the reasons discussed infra, even if this Court applies that standard,
Mr. Rome met his burden of proof through the uncontradicted testimony of trial counsel and the
evidence provided with Mr. Rome’s petition.
5 To  be  sufficient,  Mr.  Rome’s  evidence  need  only  meet  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence
standard. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443 (2008).
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under penalty of perjury, that “[m]y attorney failed to obtain a proper jury instruction for ‘aiding
and abetting’”).)6
Finally, the inference that the district court would have given that instruction had trial
counsel requested it is clear because the district court is statutorily-obligated to give requested
instructions when they are proper statements of the law which are not covered by the other
instructions. See I.C. § 19-2132; State v. Macias, 142 Idaho 509, 510 (Ct. App. 2005).  It
does not appear that the accessory-after-the-fact lesser-included instruction was covered by the
other instructions.7  Again, the standard calls for this Court to construe all factual inferences in
Mr. Rome’s favor, which means, there is certainly an inference that, had trial counsel requested
the lesser-included instruction, it would have been given consistent with the trial court’s
obligation under I.C. § 19-2132.  As such, the uncontradicted evidence Mr. Rome presented was
sufficient to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that trial counsel’s performance was
objectively unreasonable.
The other question under Strickland is  whether  that  deficient  performance  was
prejudicial.  The State does not challenge the merits of Mr. Rome’s analysis – that the applicable
legal precedent reveals there is a reasonable possibility of a different verdict if trial counsel had
6 The evidence presented in affidavits in support of the petition can, by itself, carry the
petitioner’s burden during an evidentiary hearing. Marr v. State, 163 Idaho 33, ___, 408 P.3d
31, 36-37 (2017); I.C. § 19-4907.  A petitioner’s verified allegations have the force of affidavits.
Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993).  Therefore, Mr. Rome’s verified allegations
need to be considered in this Court’s review the sufficiency of the evidence.
7 This actually highlights the impact of the district court’s failure to take judicial notice.  (See
Section I, supra.)  Because the district court refused to take judicial notice of documents from the
underlying criminal case, it does not appear that the jury instructions were actually before the
district court, and so, would not be before this Court for evaluation.  All it has is trial counsel’s
testimony and Mr. Rome’s verified allegation that trial counsel could have, but did not, request
such an instruction.  Nevertheless, the inference from that evidence is that the lesser-included
instruction was needed because it was not covered by the other instructions, and, of course, under
the proper standard, all such inferences are to be drawn in Mr. Rome’s favor in this case.
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requested the lesser-included instruction despite Idaho’s acquit-first doctrine.  (See generally
Resp. Br.)  Rather, the State simply asserts that there was no evidence of prejudice, and so, the
State believes, whether “the district court employed incorrect legal standards, even if true, [is]
irrelevant.”  (Resp. Br., p.9.)  The State’s argument is meritless under the proper standard.
As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]o establish prejudice, the petitioner must show
a  reasonable  possibility  that,  but  for  the  attorney’s  deficient  performance,  the  outcome  of  the
proceeding would have been different.” Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396, 409 (Ct. App. 2013).
That is a mixed question of fact and law. Young v. State, 115 Idaho 52, 54 (Ct. App. 1988).
Therefore, when evaluating whether the evidence presented could satisfy the prejudice element,
this Court accepts the facts as found by the district court and freely reviews the application of the
law to those facts. See id.  Since the proper standard calls for this Court to review the application
of the law to the facts of Mr. Rome’s case, his analysis of the applicable law – that several other
courts have actually found that there is a reasonable possibility, according to the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973), of a different result if
counsel had requested a viable lesser-included instruction – is not irrelevant to this Court’s
review of this issue.
At any rate, the State’s claim that there is no evidence of prejudice is disproved by the
record.  Through his verified petition, Mr. Rome attested, under penalty of perjury, that had trial
counsel made the accessory-after-the-fact argument, “the outcome of the trial probably would
have been different.  The jury probably would not have convicted me of aiding and abetting a
burglary.”  (R., pp.31-32, 37.)  Affidavits attached to a petition can, by themselves, be sufficient
to carry the defendant’s burden of proof at an evidentiary hearing. Marr, 408 P.3d at 36-37;
I.C. § 19-4907.  Because Mr. Rome verified the allegations in the amended petition, those
12
allegations have the same force as an affidavit. Mata, 124 Idaho at 593.  Furthermore, trial
counsel’s testimony – that a reasonable attorney would have made that argument – includes an
inference that making such an argument could have persuaded the jury to a different verdict.
Therefore, construing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Rome, they would establish a
possibility of a different result if trial counsel had requested the lesser-included instruction.  The
applicable law recognizes that possibility as a reasonable one.
Therefore,  Mr.  Rome presented  sufficient  evidence  to  show,  by  a  preponderance  of  the
evidence, that trial counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial.  As such, this Court should
reverse the order denying post-conviction relief on that claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Rome respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order dismissing
his post-conviction petition and remand this case with instructions for the district court to grant
the appropriate relief.
DATED this 16th day of April, 2018.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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